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Yet again in the PDF (link below) the government blames law abiding gun owners for criminal access to illegal firearms. This is a lie and unfair. Law abiding gun owners have their/our firearms locked away in secure gun safes. Gun thefts from government agencies and purchases on the black market are largely responsible for criminal access to illegal guns. Simple guns are easy to make from items which can be purchased in any major hardware store. It is not rocket science, anyone with a hacksaw, a hand drill and a screw driver can make a shotgun.
Restrictions and controls made on law abiding citizens are done so for one purpose, to control the people. The last gun confiscation by the government did nothing to make the populace safer, on the contrary, home invasions have increased along with other violent crimes.
Australians are given no legal right to carry anything for use in self defence.
National Counter-Terrorism Committee
NATIONAL GUIDELINES for the PROTECTION of PLACES of MASS GATHERING from TERRORISM
Process for engaging with places of mass gathering
Risk management in the current environment 5
Roles and responsibilities of key stakeholders in the
protection of places of mass gathering 6
Role of the Commonwealth Government 6
Role of the State and Territory governments 6
Role of State and Territory police 6
Role of the National Counter-Terrorism Committee 7
Role of owners and operators of places of mass gathering and event organisers 7
Role of Mass Gatherings Strategy Group (MGSG) 7
Role of the Business Advisory Group (BAG) 8
Roles of peak bodies and associations 8
Distribution of relevant intelligence and information/communications protocols Current security context Introduction
In November 2009, COAG SOM agreed to recommendations of the Review of the National Critical Infrastructure Protection Arrangements, including that work relating to the protection of places of mass gathering should be coordinated by the National Counter-Terrorism Committee (NCTC).
In December 2009, NCTC noted that the protection of places of mass gathering is most effectively delivered through a business government partnership, and agreed to coordinate at a national level, work associated with protecting places of mass gathering. In December 2010, NCTC agreed to establish the Mass Gatherings Strategy Group (MGSG) to operate as a national forum to share information on issues and best practice relating to the protection of places of mass gathering from terrorism.
NCTC also agreed to establish a consultative forum with business comprising national and major venue owners and operators, through a Business Advisory Group (BAG), to exchange information, and engage with law enforcement authorities to discuss Australia-wide issues relevant to the protection of places of mass gathering.
Places of mass gathering not only present terrorists with potential opportunities for mass casualties, symbolism and high impact media coverage, they pose a broad range of security challenges for their owners and operators. NCTC noted that places of mass gathering have been specifically identified by religious and political extremists as attractive targets.
All jurisdictions have robust and well tested arrangements for the planning and management of major and specific events. However, determining which places of mass gathering are at higher risk is not an easy task given the sheer number and variations of such places, and the limited security resources available. Once identified, they further present the challenge of what consistent risk mitigation strategies to develop and implement.
This document has been developed to ensure a nationally consistent approach is taken by all Australian jurisdictions in the development of their own guidelines for the protection of places of mass gathering from terrorism. The approach supports a systematic process identifying security risk management activities which can be integrated into existing jurisdictional emergency management arrangements. It provides a basis for:
• identifying places of mass gathering that are vulnerable to the threat of terrorism, and
• risk management arrangements associated with this threat, based on the roles and responsibilities shared among all private and public stakeholders.
Places of mass gathering incorporate a diverse range of facilities including, but not limited to, sporting venues, shopping and business precincts, tourism/entertainment venues/attractions, hotels and convention centres, major events and public transport hubs. This also includes significant one off events. They are characterised by having a large concentration of people on a predictable basis and often have a minimum of security controls present. Identification of places of mass gathering for the purpose of this document is based on risk and not on any arbitrary numerical threshold.
Given the pervasive threat to a diverse range of targets, the identification of places of mass gathering cannot be precise.
The identification of places of mass gathering potentially at risk from terrorism should be informed by the current security context.
The current security context for mass gatherings is provided by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) and is at Annexure A.
Places of mass gathering are potential targets for terrorist attack, particularly in larger cities, as they may satisfy the following criteria:
• provide opportunity for attack in terms of accessibility and vulnerability
• cause high-impact imagery likely to be generated by an attack
• have high symbolic value, and
• have consequences in terms of mass casualties, economic impact and public anxiety in the broader community.
By concentrating large numbers of people at high density in accessible places, at regular or predictable times, mass gatherings present the opportunity for terrorists to inflict mass casualties, cause economic damage, and instil public fear.
Places of mass gathering, or the events themselves, may have symbolic value, or be representative of Western culture. Furthermore, any terrorist attack against a place of mass gathering would generate considerable media interest.
The national approach is based on the following principles:
• counter-terrorism preparedness for places of mass gathering focuses on the protection and safety of people
• all levels of government contribute to the prevention, preparedness, response and
recovery from a terrorist incident, including local government
• event managers and owners and operators of places of mass gathering are responsible for taking reasonable steps to ensure the protection and safety of people
• prevention and preparedness arrangements for protection from terrorism are
underpinned by an intelligence-led, risk management approach
• security arrangements for places of mass gathering recognise the dynamic nature of the terrorist threat and are responsive to changes in the security environment, and
• effective security outcomes in complex mass gathering environments require cooperation and coordination between all stakeholders.